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The Congressional Budget Process: Impact on the Senate 
The House of Representatives fills an extremely important rQle under 
our constitutional system. , But if there was one stroke of genius - and 
there was more - that came ',from the minds of those constitutional fore-
bears; it was the Senate, because it is here where men will stand against 
the storms of political frenzy and in many instances throw the light of 
public scrutiny upon legislation which would otherwise be detrimental to 
the Republic •. I do not warit to see the Senate become a second House of 
Representatives. 1 
-Senate Minority Leader, Robert Byrd, .· 
June 24, 1981 
It was during the great reconciliation batt1¢ o.f 1981 and on the House 
side of Capitol Hill the storms of political frenzy were raging. The'Repub-
1ican-conservative alliance was in the process of upending·the Democratic 
majority admidst name-calling and bad feelings on both sides. Both the 
House and Senate were trying to agree on cuts of over $35 billion to exist-
ing programs and many sacrTd cows were being sacrificed. But there was less 
turbulence in the Senate. 1 Reflecting their cherished traditions the Senate 
attempted to demonstrate - in Senator Byrd's words - that they were not like 
"the other body. 11 
The Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 changed the way in which 
the U.S. Congress deals with the fiscal affairs of the nation. In attempting 
to assess the impact of the congressional budget process on the Senate, one 
must consider issues conc~rning the Senate and Congress as legislative in-
stitutions and the many kiinds of effects the budget process has had in terms_ 
of legislative procedures, political power, and national policy. ·what are 
2 
the changes? What difference do they make? ls the House really different 
than the Senate? What is there about the Senate in the 1980s.that helps 
us understand the impact of the budget process and what is there about the 
budget process that helps us understand the Senate of the 1980s? 
As assessment must begin with at .least a brief look at the modern· 
Senate and recent transitions. The role of the Senate in the fonnulation 
of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and the provisions. of that 
. . 
- . .. 
law should be examined. We will focus particularly on the:Senate Budget 
Corrmittee, designed t~ implement and enforce the budget process in the 
Senate. Because of the importance of 1981 with Republican control of the 
Senate and the use of the reconciliation process, we will compare the rec-
ord.of budgeting in the Senate from 1975-1980 with the later period.· Fi-
nally, we will attempt to draw s·ome general .conclusions about the impact 
of budget reform in the Senate. 
TRANSITIONS IN THE SENATE 
The Senate of the 1950s was the Citadel, 2 the Inner Club, the Senate 
Establishment". 3 It was a legislative body with a strong set of norms of 
behavior or "folkways. 11-4 But the Senate was changing. By t-he 1960s, 
Randall B. Ripley characterized power in the Senate as shifting from de-
centralized to individualistic. 5 By the 1970s, other changes had been 
' . 
observed. The Senate had larger Democratic majorities and had become more 
liberal. 6 While committees in the Senate have not tended to be -as strong 
' ' 
or as important as in the House, they form an important part of the indi-
vidualistic power structure. Under the Johnson rule, every Senator was 
guaranteed a major committee assignment and many chairmanships were assumed 
by members with less seniority than in the past. -Assessing the power struc-
ture of the Senate in the 1970s, Norman Ornstein et al concluded that power 
3 
was more indiv1dualisti,c and evenly distributed than before: "The Senate 
1s a more open and fluid and decentralized body·-nowthan it was inthe 
1950s. Power, resources, and decision-making authority have become more 
diffuse. 117 
By the 1980s, the Sen_ate had evolved again, with the change in. the . 
ideological makeup_ - ~he defeat of prominent liberals a~d the election of· 
a Republican majority for the first time in a quarter century.,. being the 
most significant change. . But even the 97th Senate was recogni zab 1 e to· 
the handful of Senators who had served in the 87th Senate, twenty years 
before. It 1s still a legislative body that respects deliberation,· unlim-
ited debate, independence, and does not look for strong centra 11 zed lead-
ership. Although, as we noted, corrmittees are not as dominant in the Senate, 
they are still the most important work groups. Values of corrmittee autonomy 
and prestige are still respected. In the Senate of the 1980s, even with a 
conservative, Republican majority, structures and processes tend to serve 
member needs and a decentralized, individualistic power structure. 
BUDGET REFORM IN THE SENATE, 
The centralizing budget process implemented after the Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act of 1974 would at.first glance appear to be at odds 
with the traditional norms of the Senate. However, this is actually less 
so in rea 1 i ty than on paper. From the original appointment of the Joint 
Committee on Budget Control in 1972, Senators were careful to mind tradi-
ti anal interests and va 1 ues. Countervai 1 i ng these conserving tendencies 
were the demands for reform: greater control of the budget as a whole 
(as opposed to traditional concern with only budget_parts) to halt the 
sp.iral of spending growth. 
;. 
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The Joint Study Committee.issued their report in Apri 1 of 1973 and 
made a number of specific .recommendations for restructuring the congres-
si ona-1 budget process. 8 The Senate Government Operati ans Committee began 
work on the legislation· about this time. Unlike the Joint Study Commit-· 
. . 
tee or the House Rules Corrmittee which ·had drafted the House version of the 
bi11, th~ Senate corrmittee reflected the interests of the authorizing com-
mittees .. :senators declined to foHow the House lead i_n specifying a quota 
of seats for members of the Finance and Appropriations Committees, or in 
limiting a member's tenure on the Budget committee. Like the Joint ·corrmit-
tee report and the House version of the .bi 1 l; they provided for the creation 
of a new Senate committee to oversee a, highly structured, careful lY orches-
trated budget process superimposed -on the old authorization-appropriations 
process. 
In December of 1973, the focus shifted from the Government Operati ans 
Committee to the Senate Rules Conmittee. Majority leader Robert Byrd took 
charge of the legislation and reopened negotiations to further balance the 
1 nterests of the spending committees. 9 The compromise designed by Byrd 
supported the authorizing committees by loosening the provisions that gave 
-the Appropriations conmittee tighter control ·of backdoor spending. However, 
Byrd supported the Appropriations corrmittee's position on the second con-
current resolution and reconciliation. The.balancing of conmittee inter.-
ests was explicit. The Senate was able to, "add a new and comprehensive 
budgetary framework to the existing decision-making processes with minimum 
disruption to established methods and procedures. 1110 
· The most obvious difference between the House and Senate provisions 
was the weakness of the House Budget Committee. In the House, the Ways 
· and Means and Appropriations committees were able to insure themselves di-
rect representation on the Budget_ Committee. and 1 imit the tenure a member may· 
5 
have on the committee. Committee -self interest was behind these provisions 
as much as anything else. In the Senate, there was no perceived need to in-
stitutionalize a weak budget corrmittee. This new panel was less threatening 
than in the House, reflecting a difference in the '.distribution of power in 
the two legislative chambers .. Nonetheless, one clearly observes accorrmoda.;. 
tion to committee interests in formulating the legislation in the Senate. 
Accomnodation and deference to other committees also characterizes the im-
plementation of the budget: proces_s 1n the Senate, despite the emphasis 
placed on the aggressive and combative nature of the Senate Budget Conmittee 
by many observers. 
THE PRACTICE OF BUDGETING IN iHE SENATE 1975-1980 
The Senate has been able to adapt to the new requi'rements- of the Budget 
Act better.than their House counterparts, where the battles have been more 
protracted and the debate more acrimonious. Budget resolutions have passed 
the Senate consistently by margins of a.bout 2 to 1. Bipartisan support for 
the budget resolutions was fostered by the cooperation of Budget Committee 
Chairman Edmund Muskie and ranking minority member Henry Bellmen. 
Senate support for budget resolutions is best demonstrated by examining 
the history of roll call voting on the floor of the House and Senate. Table 
1 sunmarizes these votes between 1975 and 1980 .. While the House votes were 
· {Table 1 here) 
sharply partisan and decided by very close margins, the resolutions were 
supported "by up to half of the Senate Republicans. No resol uti ans were de-
feated on the floor as in the House. This is not to say that there were 
not conflicts. Senator Muskie took an. active stance on .enforcing the bud-
get resolution and challenged various spending bills on the Senate floor. 




. Votes on Budget Resolutions. 1975-1980 . -· House and Senate ~
~ . 1!filg ;} 
-
· Northern Southern-
.Vote Republicans Democrats Democrats Democrats 
~ Resolution/Bill Yes-No· Yes-No · · Yes-No Yes-No Yes-No 
S/ 1/75 1st Resolution. FY 1976 200-196 3-128 197-68 151-33. 46-35 
11/12/75 2nd Resolution, FY 1976 · 225-191 11-124 214-67 ·162-31 52-36 
4/29/76 1st Resolution. FY 1977 221-155 13-111 208-44 · · 159-20 40-24 
9/ 9/76 2nd Resolution. FY 1977 227-151 · 12-113 215-38 154-16 61-22. 
2/23/77 3rd Resolution, FY 1977 239-169 14-119 · 225-50 176-15 49-35 
. 4/27/77 1st Resolution, FY 1978 84-320 2-135 · 82-185 50-132 32-53 
5/ 5/77 Revised 1st Res •• FY 1978 213-179 · 7-121 206~58 142-39 64-19 
9/ 8/77 2nd Reso 1 uti on. FY 1978 · 199-188 4-129 195-59 139-32 56-27 
5/10/78 · 1st Resolution, FY 1979 201-197 3-136· 198-61" 152-25 46-36 
• 8/16/78 2nd Resolution~ FY 1979 · 217-178 2-136 .215-42 154-25 61-17 
5/14/79 1st Resolution, FY 1980 220-184 9-134 211-50 147-33 64-17 
.~·, 9/27/79 2nd. Resolution, FY 1980 212-206 0-154 +85-77 · 122-57 63-20 
5/ 7/80 1st Resolution, FY 1981 225-193 . 22-131 · 203-62 128-54 75-8 
11/18/80 2nd Resolution. FY 1981 205-191 2-146 201-45 133-33 68-12 
9/ 4/80 Reconciliation. FY 1980 206-182 
{adoption.of rule} 
0-143 206-39 142-27 64-12 
·SENATE 
5/.1/75 1st Resolution, FY 1976 69-22 19-18 50-4 36-1 14-3 
11/20/75 2nd Resolution, FY 1976 69-23 19-15 50~a 41-0 9-8 
4/12/76 1st -Resolution, FY 1977 · 62-22 17-16 45-6 32-4 13-2 
9/ 9/76 2nd Resolution •. FY 1977 55-23 14.;.18 41-5 27-3 14-2 
5/ 4/77 1st Resolution, FY 1978 56-31. 15-17 41-14. 36-3 5-11 
9/ 9/77. 2nd Resolution, FY 1978 63-21 17-13 47-8 33-4 14-4 
.,.. 
4/26/78 1st Resolution, FY 1979 64-27 16-19 48-8 35-4 13-4 
9/ 6/78 2nd Reso 1 ution, FY 1979 55..;18 · 14-12 42-6 30-3 12-3 
4/25/79 1st Resolution, FY 1980 64-20 20-15 44.;.5 29-4 15.;.l 
9/19-79 2nd Resolution, FY 1980 52.:.35 17-22 45-14 28-12 17-2 
5/12/80 1st Reso 1 ution. FY 1981 68-28 19-22 49-6 31-5 18-1 
11/20/80 2nd Resolution, FY 1981 50-38 14-20 36-18 24-11 12-7 
Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports. 
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did not erode the support for their work in assembling the resolutions. As 
. - . . . 
we shall see, support for the budget resolutions remained solid under the · 
Republicans, but the nature of voting ·alignments. changed sharply. 
What is the Senate Budget Committee like compared with other Senate 
committees and the House Budget Committee? Although other Senate commit-
- . - J .. 
tees were not fonna 11y represented on the Budget Cammi ttee as. in _the House, · 
a form of de facto representation existed, as part of a process of accommo-
. . 
dation. One of the accommodations to the Appropriations Committee was in-
formal representation on the Budget Corrmittee .. In the 94th Congress, four 
of the ~i xteen members of the Budget Committee were on Appropriations. In 
the 95th Congress, this increased to six of sixteen members. The Senate 
Appropriations Committee had about twice the numerical representation on 
the Budget Cammi ttee than the House Appropriations Committee had with its 
five guaranteed seats. The Appropri-at ions Cammi t tees had received other 
concessions in the Budget Act such as the restrictions ·on. backdoor spending. 
But this informal accommodation to the Senate Appropriations Coll1llittee was 
important becuase they had the most to lose from the creation of an inde-
pendent Budget Committee. 
The Senate Finance Committee, by comp·arison, had only one of its· mem-
bers on the Budget Cammi ttee in the 95th Congress. But accorrmodati on to 
the Finance ·Committee was· 1ess · important becaus·e ·the budget process posed 
less threat to their autonomy and power. In the· formulation .of the Budget· 
Act, Finance had been able to prevent mo.re explicit revenue figures from. 
being included in the resolutions. the publicized "battles" between Muskie 
and Long between 1975 and 1979 did not alter the fact that the Finance · 
Committee 1 s domainwas-fairly secure from the start. 
;. 
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Compared to the House Committee members, Senate Budget Committee mem-
bers have tended to have lower s~ni.ority than House members. Ellwood a·nd 
Thurber reported that in the 94th Congress, their average number of years 
in the Senate was 8.8 years compared to an average of 14.8 years in·the 
H<>use. 11 By mai ntai ni ng nonns of conmittee service, a seat on the Budget 
committee was more attractive to younger members of the Senate. This has 
contributed to the greater strength of the Senate Budget _Committee. 
Are ideological differences within the Senate Conmittee less than 
within the House Committee? This wouldappear to. be a logical explanation 
for the conflict within the House Committee compar:ed to the Senate Commit-
tee. In the 95th Congress, House Budget Committee Democrats were more · 
1 i beral and Republicans were more conservative than their .party as a whole .12 
But ideology does not seem to' explain the differences, because the same 
split was found on the Senate Committee. Senate Budget Conmittee Demo-
crats had higher ADA ratings than all Senate Democrats (about 5 points 
higher) while Committee Republicans have lower ADA ratings than all Senate 
Republicans (about 16 points lower.*) The same conclusion is reached using 
ACA (Americans for Cons.titutional Action) ratings as a measure of conserva-
tism. In spite of an ideological split, similar to that of the House Com-
mittee, other factors have intervened to produce a less volatile, more har-
monious committee. 
By constituting the Senate Budget as a regular standing committee, 
traditional norms of seniority, corrmittee loyalty, and restrained partisa,:i-
ship were preserved. Members have incentives to prevent the all out con-
. flict that has taken place on the House. side. However, as Richard Fenno 
suggests, Senate committees.tend to be more permeable than House committees; 
*Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) ·ratings.: provide a rough scale of 
1 i berali sm. Higher Scores are more 1 i beral, lower, more ·conservative. 
See Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports. Actua·l figures for 94th 
Congress and comparisions with 97th Senate follow in the next section -
see Table 2. 
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they are not impregnable. 13 TradJtional committee norms. are only part of 
. . . -
the answer. The Senate Budget Committee balanced committee prestige with 
a recognition of individual member needs and a decentralized power struc-
ture, consistent with the general trends of the Senate in the late 1970s ~ · 
It appeared both in committee leadership and _; n committee deci sion-ma·king 
processes. 
Senators Muskie and Bellmen combined to provide leadership of the Bud-
get Committee based on bipartisanship and consensus building. Senators 
Hollings (D-SC) and Domenici (R-NM) appear to have continued their ~radi-
tion after the departure of Muskie and Bellman, although the strains may 
be even greater in the 1980s. There is conflict on the conmittee, and it 
often develops along party lines, but it resembles what John Manley has 
called "restrained partisanship. 1114 Once the choices were made, the com-
mittee. presented a united front on the Senat~ floor, and urged members of 
both parties to support their position. Senator Bellmen expressed this 
philosophy in opposing cuts in the first Resolution for FY 1979: 
SENATOR BELLMON: (I) voted for an even larger cut in spending 
during the markup of the resolution and.~ •• this puts me in 
somewhat of a dilemma. I have, since t~e Budget Conmittee was 
formed, consistently taken the positton that we ought to work 
as a committee, work our wills, make the best decisions we 
could, and then, having come to that conclusion, we ought to 
support that decision as a committee so that- when we came to 
the floor we would not each of us be going in our separate di-
rections and, in this way, weaken the budget process... So, · 
attractive as I find the Senator's amendment to be, I must 
say that I feel at this time, partially because other commit-
tees wi 11 not have known in advance about the impact that s·uch 
cuts might have on the areas of their concern, that the amend-
ment should be rejected. 15 
Rol 1 call votes within the committee during its first few years are in-
- - . 
structive in analyzing decision-making processes. Of the-72 recorded roll 
ca 11 votes between 1975 and 1977, ~ were straight party 1 i ne votes. This 
compares with 14 percent for.the House committee. Over half (54%) of those 
;. 
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votes in the Senate Budget Committee were party votes where a majority of 
Democrats opposed a majority of Republicans .. While this is significantly 
lower thanthe 78 percent party votes in the House Budget Committee, the 
figure is still telatively high compared to other Senate committees ... Wit.h 
three conservative Democrats who voted with the .Republicans more often 
than with the majority party, Muskie could not look on 1y to members . of his 
own party ·for support on crucial conmittee votes, .furt~er promoting bipar-
tisanship. 
· Although Senate Republicans, as a group, had the· lowest party cohesion 
scores (of the four caucuses) .. in fl oar voting, in. committee votes they had 
higher party support scores than the Democrats. This was a harbinger of a 
floor voting pattern that wou1d emerge in the Republican Senate. Th~ co;. · 
operation contrasted with the pattern•observedinthe House on voting agree-
ment between chairman and ranking minority .member in this same peri.od. 
Muskie and Bellman voted togethefon 36 of 72 recorded votes, exactly half~. 
Agreement between leaders of the House committee was only 14 percent· on all 
votes cast in committee. In comparison with the House, p~rtisanship :On 
the Budget committee is clearly more restrained. 
Not only has restrained partisanship enhanced the power and prestige 
of the Senate. Budget Committee, .but it has al so served individual· member 
needs far better than unrestrained partisanship. · 'Each committee member can 
expect to play a meaningful role on the committee.· With the fluid nature 
of voting alignments on the committee, members can maximize their bargaining 
power. This is reflected in higher conmittee attendance and participation 
than in the House. 
' 
The norm of specialization is ·generally stronger in the House than the 
Senate, but on the Budget Cammi ttee, it is a norm to be avoided. Members 
10 
are expected to be generalists, not specialists. Since the committee must 
balance the desires and requests.of a variety of competing interests, they 
must avoid being advocates of a particular set of agencies, programs. or 
another standingcommi-ttee. One member described the differences with the 
House: 
I detect more of a constitutency thing on the House side -
members pushing for their pet functions. This causes problems 
when it is brought to the floor. We have much le.ss of this on 
the Senate side. One of the reasons we have been successful 
is that the committee is an accurate reflection of the .makeup 
of the.Senate. Items fought out in the committee are not 
·fought on the floor. 16 
The committee attempted to show the Senate that they are not advocates of 
any particular point of view, rather, that they are only concerned with fis-
cal policy and discipline •. 
Decision-making processes adopted by the committee reflect accomodation . 
to individual member needs and deference to existing Senate·power. For ex-
ample, the Senate comnittee has been less specific in its subtotals than 
the House, avoiding considering line items, or specific programs within the 
functional totals. 
Accommodation to individual member needs is apparent in the way a bud;. 
get resolution is formulated. Unlike Representatives Brock Adams (D-Wash) 
and Robert Giaimo (D-Conn), Chairmen of the House Budget Conmittee in the 
1970s, Senator Muskie did not begin with a specific chairman's. 11mark. 11 The 
committee in the Senate considered 'a total for an entire function, often . 
without any further specification of how the total is to be subdivided be~ 
' 
tween committees. In addition, the Senate Committee began deliberations 
using the current policy estimates (projections of a standpat budget pro-
vided by the CBC) as .a baseline, while the House used requests in the Pres;. 
i dent' s budget as a base 1 i ne. 
•, 
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By not establishing a chainnan 1 s mark, committee members were more 
fully involved in the process of fixing totals._ One of the major comp·laints · 
of House conmittee members, especially the Republicans, was that the chair-
man'_s figures are presented as a fait accompli, and that the committee dis-
cussions were usually ignored by the chairman (and a majority of the Demo-
crats). The process of decision~making adopted by the Senate Budget Commit-
. . 
tee from 1975-1980 1 imit_ed the number of complaints from standing committees 
about the incursions on their territory, and fostered fuller participation 
by committee members. 
The budget process in the Senate was a significant departure from past 
practices, superimposing. a new apparatus over the old appropriations-autho-
rization-revenue process.- Nonetheless, from formulation, selection of mem-
' 
bers, to decision-making, the committee had carefully made sure the budget 
process "fit" the·Senate. 
BUDGETING IN THE REPUBLICAN SENATE 
By 1981, only three Democrats and one ·Republican remained from the orig-
inal Senate Budget Corrmittee., In the 97th Congress, half of the twelve Re-· 
I 
publicans on the committee were freshman while all ten Democrats had served 
in the 96th Congress. Informal representation of other committees continued 
in the 97th Congress, again favoring members of the Appropriations Committee. 
Four- Democrats - Hollings, Chiles, Johnson, and Sasser - and two Republicans 
- Andrews and Kasten - also served on the Senate Appropriations Committee. 
Although no Democrats in the 97th Congress served simultaneously on Budget 
and Finance, three of the Re pub 1 i cans a 1 so are on the Senate Finance ·cormni t-
tee. The overlap of Appropriations and BudgetCorrmittees, and the increase 
in the number of Finance Committee members on the Budget Committee-, contin-




on possibly contentious taxing and spending issues. 
Has the ideological orientation of the committee changed in the .97th 
Congress? Recall that we found in the. Senate Budget COJnmittee as ideolog-
ically divided on paper as the House Budget._ Committee, but much less di vi -
sive and partisan.in practice. Table -2 compares the liberali~m/conservatism 
(Table 2 here) 
of the first Budget Committee with the committee·in the 97th Congress. The 
ADA and ACA ratings are rough indicators of ideology and meaningful compar-
isons between years are difficult. _· The most va1id comparison is between ·· 
the average of Republicans or Democrats on the committee and the average . 
for .all members of their party in the Senate in- a given year. Ustrig this 
indicator, the ideological divisions are nearly identical to their pattern 
~ seven years ago. Corrmittee Republicans are more conservative than all 
Senate Repub 1 i cans, and committee Democrats have ratings very close _to the · 
.. 
average for a 11 -□emocrats ~ What is s i gni .fi cantly different is the numbers. 
There are twice as many Republicans in the 97th Congress as there were on 
the committee in the 94th Congress. While there are a handful of liberals 
on the Democratic side, such as Metzenbaum, Riegle, Hart,. and Bi den, there 
is a substantial conservative majority on the committee .. The freshman Re-
publicans tend to be conservative like most of the Republicans elected ·in 
1980. In this· way, the conmitteedemonstrated a continuity in the ideolog-
ical stance of the two parties, but simultaneously reflects the electoral 
turnover which has given the conservative minority in the 94th Congress . a 
maj orfty on the committee in the 97th Congress. 
1981 was an exceptional year. The patterns identified in this year. 
may not become trends, but some noticable shifts can be observed.· Looking 
at the three key votes in the Reagan economic program in Table 3 compared 






SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM 
(Ratings by Arrericaris for Democratic· Action-.;.ADA 
and.Americans for Constitutional Action--ACA) 
Senate Budget Committee--94th Congress* 
DEMOCRATS REPUBLICANS 
Name ADA ACA Name ADA 
Muskie (Maine) 80 8 McClure (Idaho) 0 
. Mondale (Minn) 75 0 Do~eni ci (NM) • 5 
Cranston (Calif) 75 4 Dole (Kans) 10 
Biden (Del) · 75 · 17 Buckley ~NY) - 5 
Magnuson (Wash) 70 9 Bellman Okla)_ . 10 
Aboureszk (SD) 60 14 Beall (Md) 20 
Moss (Utah) 55 17 
Ch i1 es ( Fl a ) .. 45 48 Average 8.3 
Hollings (SC) 40 28 
Nunn (GA) 20 · 62 
Average 59.5 20. 7 · 
Average, Senate Average, Senate 
Democrats 54.3 23.2 Republicans 25.7 










*Only one non-freshman joined the committee in the 95 Congress: Johnson (D-La. )--ADA= 
15 , . ACA=56 . 
Senate Budget Corrmittee--97th Congress 
DEMOCRATS REPUBLICANS 
Name ADA ACA Name ADA ACA 
Hollings (SC) 39 43 Domenici (Chair,NM) 17 71 
Chiles (Fla) 50 38 Annstrong (Colo) 11 100 
Biden (De]) 67 18 Kassebaum (Kan) · .37 63 
Johnston (La) 33 29 Hatch (Utah.) 17 96 
Sasser (Tenn) 67 23 Boschwitz (Minn) 28 96 
Har4_ (Colo) 61 36 Tower (Texas) 6 91 
Metzenbaum (Ohio) 83 12 Andrews (ND)* 
Riegle (Mich) 84 15 Symms (rdaho)* 
Moynihan (NY) 47 15 Grassl ey (Iowa)* 
Exon (Neb) 21 39 . Kasten ris)* 
Quayle Ind)* 
Gorton Wash)* 
Average 59.4 25.15 Ave.rage · 21.5 85.9 
Average, Senate Average, Senate 
Democrats 58. 26. Re pub 1 i cans 29. 73. 
*Denotes Freshman 
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. cans in the Senate joined ranks to provide almost unanimous support for the 
President's.program. Formerly the least cohesive of the four caucuses,· 
they displayed a cohesiveness similar tothat of-their Republican colleagues· 
(Table 3 here) 
in the House. The Democrats became slightly less cohesive, but still tended 
to support the budget rreasures by a 2·to 1111argin._ 
Republicans on the Budget Committee unanimously supported all three of 
the key votes listed on Table 3. Democrats on the comnittee divided on the 
issues as shown in Table 4 .. Seven of ten Democrats opposed the Republican 
(Table 4 here) 
majority's first resolution·, but only two of ten opposed .the tax bill in 
late July .. In contrast to the Republicans, the· Democrats on the Budget com-
mittee displayed a fluid pattern of vet i ng as the minority party. It appears , 
in general however, that the bipartisan atmosphere and patterns of decision-
making established earlier continued under Republican leadership. 
ENFORCING THE BUDGET RESOLUTIONS AND RECONCILIATION 
The greatest policy impact in the history of the budget process occurred 
in 198i when significant reductions in current policy were approved. The 
- -
Senate strained under the self imposed strictures of mandated reductions, but 
less so than the House. Tensions between the standing committees and the 
Budget Corrmittee were inevitable. To understand and eval~ate the effect of 
the use of reconciliation in 1980 arid 1981, .it is necessary to review the 
previous history of enforcement of the bud,get res·olutions in the Senate, the 
i mj:>act of the budget process. on the othe·r standing committees in the Senate. 
Particularly in making comparisions with the budget process in the 
House, the demi nant image of the .Senate .Budget Committee. was agressi ve and· 




Key Senate Votes on Reagan's Economic Plan 
Northern - Southern 
Date Measure Vote Republicans Democrats Democrats Democrats 
5/12/81 1st Resolution FY 1982: Corrmittee 78-20 50-2 28-18 14-17 14-1 
Report as amended 
6/25/81 Omnibus Reconciliation Bill of 1981 81-15 52-0 28;.15 13-15 15-0 
Cammi ttee rep"ort as amended 
7/29/81 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 89-11 52.:.1 37-10 24-8 13-2 
Co1TD11ittee report as amended 
•. 











Senate Budget Committee 
Democratic Votes on Reagan.Economic Plan* 
1st Resolution** . ·· Reconciliation** 







*Committee Republicans unanimously supported all three measures 
**Same votes used in Table 3, Roll call #s 112, 182, 239 
Yea=+ 
Nay = -











committees in the .senate when the budget targets were in danger. Did this 
image adequately reflect the most typical relationship? The issue is not 
whether there were 11 confHcts, 11 "power struggles," or ''budg~t battles" in 
the Senate; it is a question of emphasis.not revision. In reviewing the 
. relationships between committees. leading up to reconciliation in 1981 we 
will examine. episodes of conflict, routine patterns of'interaction, and 
Senator's own assessments of the· relationships. 
The Authorizing Committees and the Budget Committee· 
One of the first big tests of the Senate Budget Committee arose in 1975 
when Muskie challenged John Stennis· and the Armed Services Committee over a 
military construction bi 1 l. Even ma:ny- members of the Budget Committee were 
surprised that. the Senate sided with Muskie. A few earl,1 episodes such as 
this helped create the image of the Budget Committee and its leaders as ag- . 
gressive protectors of the process .. Given this orientation, one might imag-
' ' 
.ine that many members of the spending committees were unhappy with the bud-
get process and Budget Committee. But this has not been the case~ 
The authorizing committees were generally satisfied with· the budget 
process. There has been some grumbling about the March 15 reports and the 
May 15 deadline for reporting authorizing legislatiQn because the time con-
straints faced by the committees: required a change iri their behavior. Mainly; 
they were satisfied in the vast majority of cases. because tliey got what they 
wanted in terms of money and programs. 
The March 15 views·and estfmates submitted by the .standing cormnittees 
-~ revealed strong advocacy for higher spending. In this regard, their roles in 
the spendi.ng process are in direct conflict with the role of the Budget Com-
mittee. But as rational decision-makers, they have- adapted to the system. 
Their requests are expansive to insure-that their particular programs get a· 
15 
'place'· in the first resolution. 17 The Budget Conm1ttee has regularly re-
duced these requests, but not below what the conmittee could realistically 
live with .. An apparent adversary relationship turned out to be cooperative 
role playing. When the Budget Conmittee's cuts were toodeep, many an 
unhappy committee could challenge and get its money restored by the full 
Senate. 
Section 402 of the Budget Act allows the May 15 deadline to be wafved 
under special ci rcumstanc·es and the.waiver provisions .have been used quite 
extensively. In the Senate, authorizing committees must report a waiver 
resolution that is referred to the Senate Budget Cormtittee for their recom- · 
mendati on to the full Senate. These requirements were not impJemented 
until 1976, and in the next.three years, 101 waivers were .requested.· Only 
:.. . a few of these requests were not recommended favorably. by the Senate Bud~· 
get Committee, although in several other cases, the requests became moot. 
One might have expected that the number of requests for waivers would 
have declined as the Senate adjusted to tlie budget timetable. In 1976, . 
21 waivers were requested, increasing to 43 in 1977 and 38 in 1978. Were 
the requests for waivers justified? Table 5 lists the most common reasons 
given by the authorizing committees for reporting legislation after the 
deadline. The two most prevalent reasons, delay caused by the administra-
(Table 5 here) 
tion and unforeseen needs, appear consistent w'ith the justification for the 
402 waiver procedures. Other reasons, however, reflect delays that should 
be correctable through better planning, such as workload, staff problems, 
and unfamiliarities with procedures. 
Certain committees in the Senate used the waiver.procedures more fre-
quently than others. Table 6 reveals that about 70% of the ,waivers were 
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. TABLE 5 
Reasons for Waiver of .Budget Act 
1975-1978 
(402 waivers - authorization deadlines) 
Reason 
Delay caused by Administration 
Emergency; unforeseen needs 
Committee workload, inadequate time, 
other priority legislation 
Committee reorganization, adjournment, 
staff problems 
Other congressional delays 
Committee error, unfamiliar with 
procedures 











N = 101 
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TABLE 6 
Budget Act Waivers 
Frequency by Senate Committees 1975-1978 
Co1T111ittee 
Foreign Re 1 a-ti ons 
· Waivers Requested 
11* 
· Energy (Select) 
Environment and Public Works 
Agriculture 
Judiciary 
Indian Affairs (Select) 
Banking and Currency 
Armed Services-










* One request rece-ived unfavorable recommendation. from Senate Budget 
Committee 
** One request not acted on by Senate Budget Committee 
'irk* Three requests :from individual members, not committees. 
.• 
16. 
requested by eight Senate conmittees. Foreign Relations headed the list with 
eleven requests. Both Foreign Relations and the Select Conmittee on. Energy 
had a greater problem.with administration-caused delays. Others, like Envi-
ronment and Public Works, Agriculture, and Judiciary, have less valid reas.ons 
·for frequent .waiver requests. 
Why did not the Senate enforce the waiver provis:ions more rigorously 
in the first few years? The reason was that the cost on antagonizing autho-. 
rizing committees was not worth the benefit of cleaning up the loose ends 
of the process. The fact that the· House has been somewhat more guarded in 
granting waivers. despite their relative weakness, suggests again that the . 
. Senate Budget Committee was very accommodating to the legislative committees. 
The Appropriations Committee and the Budget Committee 
Early in its existence, the Budget Committee challenged the Appropri- · 
ations Conmittee, and obtained approval from the Democratic caucus .for the 
right to have joint jurisdiction with Appropriations in handling presiden~ 
tial rescissions and deferrals. Ellwood and Thurber have argued that the 
comparative advantage to Muskie and the committee was quite small, but that 
it ,was important to assert their authority and establish their- existence. 18 
Was this typical of their actions towards the Appropriations Committee? 
Fonner Appropriations Chairman John McClelland was originally skeptical 
but soon ·became a strong ally of Muskie ind the Budget Committee.· Despite 
the challenge by Muskie over impoundment jurisdiction, the Senate Appropri-
ations was not threatened by line-item estimates by the'Budget Corrmittee. 
Muskie commented: 
"We do not go into the program detai'l that the Appropri a-
ti ons ·committee does. If we were to do the actual allocation 
by appropriation bill, we would be.doing the Appropriations 
Committees' work. That_is nst our responsibility.· 19 
The Senate Appropriations Committee had more to gain than their.-House 
. . ' 
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counterparts, since the new process enabled·the committee to approach parity 
with the House,.· Joel Havemarin. concluqed that the budget process assisted 
McClelland iri consolidating his power as chairman by givfng him more control 
over the subcorrimittees. 2° For these reasons, the relationship emerged into 
an alliance. 
The members of both Budget and Appropriations indicated that the domi-
nant pattern was one of cooperation. One member, who was on both comnittees, 
commented:: 
From the start, there has been a mutual respect betwee·n 
the two committees (Budget and Appropriations) ••• ! think 
that Appropriations actually appreciates our efforts to hold. 
down spending - it relieves some of the pressure on them. 21 
A Democrat on the Appropriations· Committee echoed this sentiment: 
We get along with them (Budget Committee) very well and 
have had very few problems. At first some of my more senior 
colleagues were resentful - felt a little threatened but we 
have moved away from this after the first year. This has 
been a meaningful change accomplished together, and I believe 
we (on Appropriations) have improved our perfonnance. 22 
Few appropriations bills were challenged by the Budget Committee on the 
Senate floor. They have had their members constitute up to 40% of the Bud-
get Committee, whfch helped insure that their interests were protected. The 
committee has also acted as an advocate in the.process. Appropriations sub-
committee Chairman William Proxmire, self proclaimed budget cutter· and spon-
sor of the "Golden Fleece" award, described how experience taught.him how to 
behave: 
I made a low estimate and lived to regret it. I fought 
for the estimate, but I lost. Ever since then I have· been a 
little gunshy and I have attempted to come in high r11ther 
than low. They (the estimates) can contain everything in-
cluding the kitchen sink. It is easier and safer to suggest 
a high figure so that in the end one will look good by coming 
in under it rather than submitting a lower figure which may. 
be exceeded. 23 
18 
The Appropriations subcommittees in -the Senate were able to insure that 
the vast majority of their spending goals were achieved. Despite some· 
overt cuts, the budget resolutions over the first five years expanded to 
meet the desires of the Appropriations and authorizing comlllittees.-
The Finance Committee and the Budget Committee 
There was less cooperation between the Senate Finance Committee and 
the Budget Committee over this period. Senator Muskie's observations on 
the~control exercised by Finance were only half-humorous. 
The Finan;e Committee now controls the entire revenue 
side of the budget, which is 50 percent of it.,· and then -if 
you lo.ck at the spending side, medicare, medicaid, social se-
curity and so on - You add it altogether; yes, and I expect_ 
it is close to 75 percent-of tbe whole budget which _goes 
through the Finance Committee. We don't focus on it, we let 
it grow, and I don.'t blame Russell (Long) for not wanting . 
the budget process; he has got 75 percent of the budget now, 
why should he give to anybody else any part of it? {Laughter). 24 
The expansion of tax expenditures has allowed the Finance Committee to 
enlarge its pol icy domain since the implementation of the budget process, 
even if its discretion was reduced in other ways by re.forms in the early 
1970s. · The Budget Act requires the Budget Committee, 11 to devise methods of 
coordinating tax expenditures, policies and programs with direct budget 
outlays," but the Act did not equate tax expenditures with direct outlays. 
The Budget Committees list tax expenditures, but they are not approved in 
the resolutions. ·There is no provision for Congress to directly contro_l 
tax expenditures, or integrate revenue decisions with other budget choices. 
To date, the Budget Committees have been unab_le to curb the expansion of 
these individually popular measures, including the 1981 tax bill which con-
tained a bonanza of tax expenditures. 
When he was comm1 ttee . Cha fnnan, Russell Long resisted any attempts to 
bring his cormiittee's actions under closer scrutiny arid centralized control. 
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Senator Muskie described the root of the problem·: --
Our problem with Finance is that there is only one num-
ber in the budget resolution that -affects revenues, and that 
is the overall revenue floor. If we adjust that to accommo-
date some total of tax expenditure reform, as we did two 
years ago, $2 biJlion, you see Russell (Long) is astute 
enough so he can put together a totally unanticipated pack-
age of offsetting changes in the revenue code that would 
fit under the $2 bi 11 ion restriction ••• Russel 1 (long) plays 
the game superbly. He is defending his committee's Juris-
diction and no comili ttee in the Senate has expanded its ju-
risdiction over more substantiveprogram areas ••• than Fi-
nance. 25 
In the first budget resolution in 1976, the Senate Budget Committee 
included a figure of $2 billion in revenue to- be gained from tax reform. 
·Long opposed it on two grounds. First, he pointed out that tax. reform leg-
islation usually does not take effect immediately, and second, .he argueo 
that the Budget Co11111i ttee h·ad no ·right to i_ns truct the Fi n~-nce Committee. 26 
Muskie and the committee held their position and took the fight to the 
Senate floor, where Long prevailed in a number of votes. 
Other conflicts took place in these first few years. The Finance Com-
mittee met the totals of the first resolution for FY 1978, but contrary to 
Budget Corrmittee suggestions. The Budget Committee urged the Senate to 
change the Finance Cormiittee's bill. Senator Lloyd Bentsen argued for the 
Finance Committee: 
If ft (the Budget Committee) can deal with-specificity 
and detail as to which taxes should be raised and which 
taxes should be lowered, then it has taken ·over the respon-
s i bi 1 ity of the Senate Finance Committee ••• If that happens, 
you.are going to see·this same pattern followed in the Ap-
propriations Conmittee and finally, in the other authoriz-
ing committees, and you will have seen the_ destruction, I 
think, of the budget reform act. 27 · 
The Senate upheld the position of the Finance Committee in a close vote. 
Enough other committees (and a majority of committee chairmen) were concerned 
about-the encroachments of the Budget Committees.· -
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The Senate Budget Committee has played an active and often ass~rtive 
role in enforcing the budget resolutions •. Some of their actions can be 
attributed to the norma 1 desire of a commi tt~e protect and expand their : 
power and jurisdiction. Both Dennis Ippolito and Allen Schick generally 
· arrive at similar conclusions concerning the impact of the budget process 
. . 
on Senate corrmi t tees. - I ppo 11 to cone ludes -that· the Finance Committee re- --
fused to accept any formal recognition of the Budget Commjttee's expanded 
claims. 28 He calls the budget committees 11adding-machine committees that 
take the demands of spending committees and impose as much restraint on them 
_ as the current congressional mood. allows. 11 29 Schick strongly emphasizes 
the roll of accommodation in multiple dimensions of the budget process and 
suggests that, 11 the trick for the Budget Committees is to accomrnodate·with-
out .surrendering all meaningful enforcement. 1130 The experience with recon-
ci 1 iation in the Senate in 1981 might appear to provide the biggest cha·,_ 
lenge to the accommodation thesis. In contrast with the House and in 
comparing the policy impact of the budget process, reconciliation provides 
an extremely useful perspective with which to complete our analysis. 
Reconciliation 
The reconciliation provisions are found in section 310(c)(d)(e) _of the 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act. In the original language of the ·statute, 
the budget resolutions may determine that spending authority contained in 
the laws, bills ·and resolutions of a committee- is to be changed. If more 
than one corrmittee is involved, the Budget Corrmittees receive recommendations 
• and report a bi 11 to the ful 1 chamber. Debate in the Senate on any recon-
ciliation bill or resolution is limited to twenty hours. Dormant for the 
first five years of the budget process, it was first used in the Senate in 
1980, resulting in a bill late in the year that produced cutbacks of about 
.,. 
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$8 billion. Originally intended to ·be used at the end of the process in 
conjunction with the second resolution, reconciliation was chosen as the. 
vehicle for the Reagan administration to achieve its desired budget cut-
backs at the beginning of the congressional budget process. This adapta-
. ti on of the reconcfl i ati on process was not done by amending the budget 
act, but simply by providing for it through a concurrent resolution. Al- ~ 
though a number of legal and parl iarnentary. issues have been, rai·sed con-
cerning the use of reconciliation, the real issues are political. ·eongress 
can operate under any set of rules they see fit and the events·of 1981 rep-
resent the wishes of a majority. But the House and Senate went about the 
task differently. 
The first resolution passed in Mai mandated cutting over $35 billion 
from existing programs. After a month of arguing,. haggling, bargaining 
into the wee hours of the morning, the Senat.e arrtved at a package that, 
if not enthusiastically endorsed, was acceptable to a majority. Senator 
Edward Kennedy commented on the package of cuts adopted by the Committee. 
on Labor and Human services, where he is ranking minority member of a com- · 
mittee chaired by conservative Senator Orrin Hatch. 
These are si gni fi cant victories that make our reconci 1i a-
ti on package a major improvement over the admi ni strati. on' s 
original proposals. They have been achieved with bipartisan 
support on the committee. They have been accepted by the ad-
ministration, the majority leader, and the ·chairman of the 
Budget committee. 31 
The House, too, had a.month of cutting and struggling with the recon-
ciliation package, but in contrast to the grudging acceptance by Senators, 
the stunned Democratic 1 eaders and committee chai nnen saw their work com:- · 
pletely thrown out and replaced by a hastily assembled substitute largely 
dictated by the Reagan administration. Note the conments or Representa-
tive Kika de la Garza, Chairman of the House Agriculture Conmittee. 
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I resent the fact that the Committee on Agriculture of 
the House of Representatives and.their members, their power 
and their jurisdiction have been µsurped by a Member of this 
House* and some unelected member of the administration** and 
in some corner or some dark alley or hallway or heaven knows 
where they meet; they wrote and maybe are still writing what 
is going to be our package for agriculture. I resent and I 
challenge the right of anyone to do that. · 32 
While reconciliation may have had a significant effect on the congres-
sional connnittee system, on the emphasis of lawmaking over representation, 33 
and on legislative-executive power in natfonal politics, the Senate appears-
. -
to have done less violence to its norms, procedures, and legislative process.· 
· The 11tyrannical majority" did not rule, as in the House. 
Without minimizing the radical nature .of the reconciliation process in 
the Senate, there is evidence t.o suggest that some of the earlier patterns_ 
established by the Budget Connnittee in accommodating the needs of the other 
~- committees was exhibited in drafting the reconciliation- biJl. There is evi-
dence to suggest that the bipartisan spirit on the Budget Committee developed 
by the Democrats when they were in the majority prevented all out warfare 
when the Republicans gained control of the Senate. There is evidence that 
compared to -the House,_ traditional norms of autonomy, reciprocity, and the 




Much more can be said about.the impacts of the budget process on the 
Senate. This paper has attempted to take an overv.i ew of some of the di f-
ferent results. The events of 1981, which challenged some of our previous 
conclusions and reinforced others, demonstratf:!s therdynamic quality of con-
*Representative Phil Gramn (D-Tex) 




gressional budgeting. Nonetheless, some general·conclusions can be sug-
gested. 
The. budget process added a degree of order and discipline to Senate 
deliberations on the budget not previously seen. The .Senate Budget Conmit-
tee became a significant force tn the legislative process and in the formu-· 
lation of taxing and spending policy. The quality of budgetary information 
in the· Senate has improved due to the activities of the·congressional Budget 
Office and the staff of the Budget Conmittee. Differences with the House 
. . . 
Budget Committee and the Budget process in the House provide additional in-
si,ghts into the Senate. We observed differences in the impact of-ideological 
cleavages, partisanship, styles of leadership, and relationships to other 
committees. It seems clear that despite the seemingly radic.al and central-
izing nature of the budget process, that in many ways. it was i-mplemented in 
a manner consistent with Senate traditions. 
Accommodation to the other conmittees and the power structure of the 
Senate was cited in a number of instances, from the drafting of the l egi s-
1 at ion to its implementation to, most recently, the way reconciliation was 
hanqled. In terms of procedural impact, the budget process has had a sig-
nificant impact on the Senate, but it clearly_ has not solved all_-the prob-
lems. Although the record in completing action on spending bills in a 
timely and orderly fashion was excellent in the first few years of the 
process, 1980-and 1981 resembled the chaos of the prerefonn years. This 
·problem was particularly actute in the Senate in the fall of 1981 when, 
without the leadership of the· White House, the Republican majority seemed 
. . . 
incapable of bringing the budget to an orderly conclusion. For the first 
tine in seven years, Congress failed to finish their process, opting simply 
to reco-nfirm the first resolution with its obviously inaccurate assumptions. 
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The impact of the budget process on budget totals and national policy 
was surprisingly small before 1981. Despite some pronounced House-Senate 
differences, the totals that the two bodies arrived were remarkably similar, 
and not significantly different from current policy baselines. While a 
number of important choices were made using the budget process on an indi-
. vidual basis, the aggregate of budget decisions did not depart from a pat-
tern of steady growth. Not until 1981, spurred by leadership from the 
Reagan administration, did the budget process produce a striking policy effect. 
It may seem ironic to some that the budget process which was implemented to 
make Congress more independent froin the president had its first rea 1 -impact 
because of presidential leadership.. Despite the furor over reconci li at ion. 
and regardless of what one thinks of the speci fie budget cuts, the fact that 
.. majorities· in_ Congress were able to respond in a quick and orderly fashion 
i 
is more a tribute to the p.rocess than· an_ indictment.· 
The budget process has had an impact on power in _the Senate and in na-
tional government. In the first seven years, Congress demonstrated both that 
they could be independent from the President (Ford's first budget, for example) 
and that they could be responsive to a president. Other factors are critical 
here. Reagan is not- Nixon and 1982 is different than 1972 in terms of pres-
idential-congressional relations. Perhaps the Senate cooperation with Reagan 
is more typical of the relationship that will emerge in the future than the 
experience of either Ford or Carter. In terms of power within Congress, the 
Senate seems to be more nearly the equal of the House in matters of taxing 
and spending. The budget process has been a great leveler in that regard. 
Reconciliation as practiced in 1981 is most probably an anomaly. The comnft-
tee system is not dead, and the Budget committees have not supplanted other 




congress i ona 1 budget., process. Only the future wi 11 revea 1 how the Congress 
will respond to the growing frustrations of estimation, uncontrollables, 
off-budget items, and economic assumptions which threaten to scuttle serious 
policy making. Whatever the difficulties, it seems clear that the Senate ·· 
and the entire Congress is better equipped to deal with th~m than they were 
before 1975 . 
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